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and Wrongful Life in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can birth or life be "wrongful"? In January 1983 the Wash-
ington State Supreme' Court confronted this question and
approved the controversial "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life"1
causes of action in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.2 The evolution
of these "new torts"3 has been difficult and inconsistent. Past
judicial consideration of these issues has resulted in sharp disa-
greement over policy justifications. Various parties have
described the factual and philosophical bases for the actions in
such terms as an "utter void of nonexistence,"" a "Fascist-
Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity,"5 and a "retreat
into meditation on the mysteries of life."6
State courts differ on the recognition of these torts. Since
1973 every jurisdiction confronted with a wrongful birth issue or
1. Terminology presents an underlying problem in the analysis of wrongful birth
and wrongful life. Both terms have been used interchangeably to denote fundamentally
different actions. See Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 18-19 (1978). Some courts use the term
wrongful birth in cases of wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy. E.g., Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981). Other courts use the term wrong-
ful life in cases of illegitimacy and "dissatisfied life." E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App.
2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See also Rog-
ers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and
Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 717-18 (1982). In addition, the terms carry an
emotional connotation that can interfere with the analysis of the issues. See Capron,
Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 647 (1979) (critics of these
causes of action contend that neither birth nor life can be wrongful and that the actions
"disavow the sanctity of life"). See infra notes 175-89 and accompanying text. These
misconceptions and definitional problems compounded the problems that the Washing-
ton court faced in analyzing wrongful birth and wrongful life.
2. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
3. See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
4. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967), overruled in part,
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
5. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(comment was made by counsel, not by the court).
6. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 488 (1980), overruled in part, Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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claim has accepted this cause of action,7 but wrongful life has
met with very limited acceptance. In Harbeson, a unanimous
Washington State Supreme Court broke from this pattern and
recognized both wrongful birth and wrongful life as causes of
action.' This decision has fostered considerable concern and
comment.10
The recognition of the wrongful birth and wrongful life
causes of action by the Washington State Supreme Court is sup-
ported by both policy rationales and legal theories. Wrongful
birth and wrongful life causes of action receive support from
traditional tort principles" and, more important, further public
policy by deterring negligent genetic counseling12 and negligent
preconception medical treatment. 3 This Note describes the legal
history of these claims and analyzes several issues not addressed
by the Washington court. In addition, this Note criticizes a more
7. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law)
(failure to inform mother that child might be handicapped as the result of the mother's
first-trimester rubella); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (mis-
diagnosis of tests for Down's syndrome); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (misdiagnosis of amniocentesis indicating Tay-Sachs dis-
ease); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981) (failure to recognize mother's
illness as genetic malady); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209
(1981) (failure to inform parents of genetic risks after mother's rubella); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to notify parents of availability of amni-
ocentesis tests for Down's syndrome), modified, Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d
834 (1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(failure to inform parents of risk of Down's syndrome in older mothers); Speck v. Fine-
gold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (negligent sterilization sought to prevent
transmission of neurofibromatosis), modified, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (failure to warn parents of genetic risks after
mother's rubella); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (negligent per-
formance of tests for Tay-Sachs disease); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (failure to warn parents of genetic risks after mother's rubella).
8. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980) (negligent performance of tests for Tay-Sachs disease), overruled in part, Turpin
v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97
N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (misdiagnosis of mother's rubella); Becker v. Schwartz, 60
A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977) (failure to inform parents of risks of Down's syn-
drome), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Ches-
sin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (failure to diagnose fatal hereditary illness in
prior child), modified, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978).
9. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 462, 656 P.2d at 486.
10. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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recent decision " by the court, which limits wrongful conception
causes of action, because that decision conflicts with the policy
arguments presented in Harbeson."5
II. THE Harbeson CASE
The plaintiffs in Harbeson were Leonard and Jean Harbe-
son and their children, Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson. In
December 1970 Jean Harbeson suffered a grand mal seizure' 6
and was diagnosed as an epileptic. 17 Military physicians' s pre-
scribed Dilantin'9 to control the seizures. Subsequently, the
Harbesons were transferred to a military base in Washington
State, and Mrs. Harbeson went to Madigan Army Medical
Center 20 for treatment of her epilepsy.2'
When the Harbesons contemplated having more children,
they consulted three doctors at Madigan about the risks of using
Dilantin during pregnancy.2 2 Although each doctor explained
that cleft palate2 3 and temporary hirsutism 2 4 could result, none
of the doctors conducted a search of relevant literature for a
potential correlation between Dilantin and birth defects.26 The
Harbesons contended that if they had been informed of the
potential birth defects associated with the use of Dilantin during
14. McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
15. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
16. A grand mal seizure is a sudden loss of consciousness followed immediately by
generalized convulsions. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 531 (25th ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as DORLAND'S].
17. 98 Wash. 2d at 462, 656 P.2d at 486.
18. Leonard Harbeson was a member of the United States Air Force. Families of
military personnel receive medical treatment at military medical centers. Id.
19. Dilantin is a registered trademark for phenytoin sodium capsules. Dilantin is an
anticonvulsant drug that is prescribed for epilepsy and for various types of seizures to
assist the ability of the muscles to avoid seizure. For chemical and pharmacological infor-
mation on Dilantin, see PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1478-84 (37th ed. 1983).
20. Madigan Army Medical Center serves McChord Air Force Base in Tacoma,
Washington. McChord was Mr. Harbeson's new duty station. 98 Wash. 2d at 462, 656
P.2d at 486.
21. Mrs. Harbeson's new neurologist continued administering Dilantin. Id. at 463,
656 P.2d at 486.
22. Id.
23. A palate is the plate of cartilage that separates the nasal cavity from the mouth
cavity. Cleft palate is "a palate having a congenital fissure in the median line." DOR-
LAND'S, supra note 16, at 1120. A "congenital fissure" is a groove or division in the palate.
Id. at 371.
24. Hirsutism is "abnormal hairiness, especially in women." Id. at 716.
25. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 463, 656 P.2d at 486.
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pregnancy, they would not have had any more children.2" Rely-
ing on the doctors' assurances, the Harbesons decided to have
more children, and Mrs. Harbeson later gave birth to two chil-
dren, Elizabeth and Christine.2"
Elizabeth and Christine were born with "fetal hydantoin
syndrome, ' ' 8 a condition characterized by growth deficiencies,
developmental retardation, wide-set eyes, and other physical
and developmental defects." Mrs. Harbeson did not suspect
that Dilantin had caused her children's birth defects until she
saw a poster at Madigan warning of the correlation between
Dilantin and birth defects. 30 Subsequent tests established that
Dilantin was the cause of the defects.3 '
After hearing the evidence, the federal district court 32 made
a number of conclusions of law3 3 and certified to the Washington
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The other defects include lateral ptosis and hypoplasia of the fingers. Id. at 463,
656 P.2d at 486. Lateral ptosis is a drooping of the upper eyelid. DORLAND'S, supra note
16, at 1285. Hypoplasia is "the incomplete development of an organ so that it fails to
reach adult size." Id. at 752.
30. Brief of Appellant at 4, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656
P.2d 483 (1983).
31. Id. at 6.
32. The Harbeson's claim was filed in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington. 98 Wash. 2d at 462, 656 P.2d at 486. The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674-2680 (1976), was the controlling procedural law because
the claim was against physicians employed by the United States.
33. The District Court issued the following conclusions of law:
4. Dilantin was a proximate cause of the defects and anomalies suffered by
Elizabeth and Christine Harbeson.
7. The physicians at Madigan failed to conduct a literature search or to con-
sult other sources in regard to the effects of Dilantin during pregnancy, even
though the plaintiffs Leonard and Jean Harbeson specifically asked all three
Madigan physicians of possible birth defects associated with the mother's con-
sumption of Dilantin during pregnancy. Said acts of the Madigan physicians:
a. breached the standard of care for the average physician acting
under the same or similar circumstances, and the physicians were
thereby negligent;
b. were not reasonably prudent, and therefore, were negligent.
8. An adequate literature search, or consulting other sources, would have
yielded such information of material risks associated with Dilantin in preg-
nancy that reasonably prudent persons in the position of the Harbesons would
attach significance to such risks in deciding to have further children.
9. Each of the four Harbeson plaintiffs has sustained permanent and severe
damages and injuries past, present and future, as a direct and proximate result
of the negligence of the Madigan physicians.
Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 463-64, 656 P.2d at 486-87.
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State Supreme Court the question of whether the wrongful birth
and wrongful life actions could be maintained in Washington.34
The state supreme court answered those questions in Harbeson
and established that in appropriate circumstances, parents can
maintain wrongful birth actions and their children can maintain
wrongful life actions. The court also set forth the standard for
the measure of damages in each claim. The measure of damages
for a parent's successful wrongful birth claim is the pecuniary
damage associated with the child's birth, the special pecuniary
damages arising from the child's defective condition, and the
parent's emotional injuries caused by the birth of the defective
child.3 5 The measure of damages for a child's successful wrongful
life claim is the cost of special medical treatment and training
associated with the defects. 6
III. WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. Historical Development
The first claim by parents for the wrongful birth of a child
born with defects was in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,37 a case before
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1967. In Gleitman, the plain-
tiff contracted rubella during her pregnancy. When she informed
her gynecologist of the illness, he told her that the rubella would
not affect the child.38 The doctor failed to inform the plaintiff
that there was a twenty-percent chance that defects would
occur. 9 The mother claimed that if she had known of the possi-
bility of defects, she would not have allowed the pregnancy to
continue and would have obtained an abortion. 0
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's
claim and the concept of wrongful birth for two reasons. First,
the court stated that the current public policy against abortion
would not support the recognition of a wrongful birth cause of
action. In the court's language, "substantial policy reasons pre-
vent this Court from allowing tort damages for the denial of the
34. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 464, 656 P.2d at 487.
35. Id. at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
36. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
37. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979).
38. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
39. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
40. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
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opportunity to take an embryonic life." '41 The second reason for
rejecting wrongful birth was the difficulty of measuring dam-
ages.42 To determine the damages, the court said that it would
have to "evaluate the denial to them [the parents] of the intan-
gible, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of mother-
hood and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged emo-
tional and money injuries. '
The rejection of wrongful birth claims merely because of
public policies against abortion lost some legal support in 1973
with the decision in Roe v. Wade.4 In Roe, the United States
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right of privacy and
applied that right to a person's procreative activities, including
abortion in some circumstances."5 Once this constitutional right
was established, any interference with that right would create a
cause of action for the parents.
Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a
wrongful birth action, reversing Gleitman, in Berman v. Allan.46
The court noted the legal changes in the twelve years since
Gleitman, principally the Roe decision, and stated that "[p]ublic
policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposi-
tion that she [the mother] not be impermissibly denied a mean-
ingful opportunity to make that decision. '4 7 Other jurisdictions
adopted similar reasoning and accepted claims of wrongful birth
of children with defects, noting the inapplicability of abortion
41. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693..The court continued by invoking its "felt intuition"
that, if given a choice, the child "would almost surely choose life with defects as against
no life at all" and by quoting Theocritus: "[flor the living there is hope, but for the dead
there is none." Id.
42. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
43. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe decision extended the constitutional right of pri-
vacy to a woman's decision of whether to have an abortion, without regulation by the
state, during the first trimester of pregnancy. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion estab-
lished a balancing test of the woman's right to privacy and the state's right to protect
unborn fetuses. The decision has been widely cited by those who seek to limit the state's
involvement in procreative decisions and, in the case of wrongful birth, to establish a
zone of privacy that, if invaded, creates a cause of action. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); In re R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 190, 641 P.2d 704, 708
(1982).
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
46. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), modified, Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432
A.2d 834 (1981).
47. Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14. The Berman court recognized that not
allowing recovery "would in effect immunize from liability those in the medical field" if
their advice interfered with the woman's "constitutional right to abort fetuses." Id.
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considerations in the analysis of the cause of action."8 Since Roe
v. Wade, all courts facing wrongful birth actions have accepted
this reasoning. 9
The difficulty of measuring the damages that result from a
wrongful birth was the second concern noted in Gleitman.5 ° This
issue has not been resolved as easily as the abortion and privacy
issues. The measure of damages varies widely from state to
state.' The three current variations are: first, all the costs of
raising the child;52 second, the special cost incurred in raising
the child;53 and third, the pecuniary and emotional damages suf-
fered by parents plus the special costs of raising the child.54
B. The Washington View
When the Washington Supreme Court considered wrongful
birth in Harbeson, the cause of action was well established in
other jurisdictions.55 The court began by defining wrongful birth
as the parents' action against "a physician [who] failed to inform
[them] of the increased possibility that the mother would give
birth to a child suffering from birth defects ... [thereby pre-
cluding] an informed decision about whether to have the
child. '5 6 Under this definition, wrongful birth actions would be
limited to violations of the physician's duty to obtain informed
consent.5 Injuries arising from negligently performed steriliza-
tion procedures or genetic counseling would not be actionable.
48. E.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (failure to warn parents of
genetic risks after mother's rubella); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975) (failure to warn parents of genetic risks after mother's rubella).
49. See supra note 7.
50. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
51. For a more detailed examination of the differing measures of damages, see
Capron, supra note 1, at 634-45; Moore, Wrongful Birth-The Problem of Damage Com-
putation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 1, 4 (1979); Trotzig, Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrong-
ful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 33-37 (1980).
52. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 1981).
53. E.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026-27 (Fla. App. 1981); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975), Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
776, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975).
54. E.g., Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 367, 308 N.W.2d 209, 213
(1981); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 68, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981); Speck v. Finegold,
497 Pa. 77, 82, 439 A.2d 110, 111-12 (1981); Naccash v. Berger, 223 Va. 406, 415-16, 290
S.E.2d 825, 830-31 (1982).
55. See supra note 7.
56. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 465, 656 P.2d at 487 (quoting Comment, Berman v.
Allan, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1979)).
57. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 465-67, 656 P.2d at 487-88.
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After presenting this definition, the court discussed with
approval the case of Speck v. Finegold.5 8 In that case, a man
who suffered from a genetic disorder called neurofibromatosis59
underwent a vasectomy to avoid having children and passing on
the disorder. The vasectomy was negligently performed, and
Mrs. Speck became pregnant and gave birth to a daughter who
also suffered from neurofibromatosis. The Washington court saw
no reason to exclude this type of action from the definition of
wrongful birth.60 The breach of the physician's duty to perform
sterilization procedures with due care has the same effect of
interfering with the parents' right to make decisions about
childbearing as does the failure to secure informed consent.
Therefore, the Washington court held that wrongful birth arises
when the parents' right to prevent the birth of deformed chil-
dren is violated.6 1
An examination of when a medical practitioner's actions can
violate parental rights requires a discussion of the elements of
negligence. Those elements are duty, breach of that duty, causa-
tion, and injury.62 In Washington, medical practitioners owe a
duty to patients to secure informed consent 3 and to perform
medical procedures with due care. 4 Because the current state of
58. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
59. Neurofibromatosis is a genetically transmitted disease characterized by develop-
mental defects and by the formation of soft tumors over the entire body. DORLAND'S,
supra note 16, at 1040-41.
60. The court noted that the defendants in Speck had breached a duty of care in
performing the vasectomy, and that the breach of that duty interfered with the parents'
right to prevent the birth of a defective child in the same way as does the absence of
informed consent. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 466, 656 P.2d at 488.
61. Id. at 466-67, 656 P.2d at 488.
62. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
63. The doctrine was enunciated in Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 289-90,
522 P.2d 852, 864 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975), and
was codified in 1976. The relevant statute provides:
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury resulted
from health care in a civil negligence case or arbitration involving the issue of
the alleged breach of the duty to secure an informed consent by a patient or
his representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a material fact
or facts relating to the treatment . ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1983).
64. The standards of medical care were most recently codified in 1975:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against a hos-
pital . . . the plaintiff . . . shall be required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant or defendants failed to exercise that degree of
skill, care, and learning possessed at that time by others in the same profession
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medical knowledge is such that physicians can predict some con-
genital6 5 and teratogenic6" defects, the Harbeson court held that
doctors owe a duty to secure informed consent for genetic coun-
seling and preconception treatment.0 7
The inclusion of genetic counseling in the practitioner's
duty of informed consent provides an incentive to perform
genetic tests in an effort to reduce the incidence of genetic
defects. One way that the courts can support this incentive is to
allow recovery for breach of the requirement to secure informed
consent. The failure of the Madigan physicians to secure
informed consent interfered with the parents' right to control
their procreation. 8 The Washington court held, as have other
jurisdictions in recent cases, that parents have a right to prevent
the birth of a deformed infant. 9
The court defined proximate cause for wrongful birth cases
as cause in fact because it believed that the causation and duty
questions were governed by the same basic policy. Thus, cause
in fact is sufficient, according to the court.70 No further analysis
of policy limitations on recovery was necessary, and the court
chose not to use foreseeability as the proximate cause stan-
dard.71 However, even if the court had chosen foreseeability, the
causation element would have been satisfied in this case. The
injury resulting from the breach of informed consent is to the
parents' right to decide whether or not to have children. The
parents' visit to a physician, whether for genetic counseling or
for medical sterilization, demonstrates that the birth of a child is
WASH. RE V. CODE § 4.24.290 (1983).
65. Congenital defects are those that occur during fetal development for any reason.
DORLAND'S, supra note 23, at 351.
66. Teratogenic defects are those that occur during fetal development. Id. at 1549.
The term is often used when defects arise from the introduction of a chemical that alters
the genetic structure.
67. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
68. Id.
69. For specific discussions of the right to prevent the birth of a deformed child, see
Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 71, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa.
77, 84, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 776, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975).
70. "The legal question whether liability should attach is essentially another aspect
of the policy decision which we confronted in deciding whether the duty exists. We
therefore hold that as a matter of law in wrongful birth cases, if cause in fact is estab-
lished, the proximate cause element is satisfied." Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 476, 656 P.2d
at 493.
71. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 62, at 297-300.
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being considered. Thus, a failure to secure informed consent or
to perform medical procedures with due care includes the fore-
seeable risk of children, and children with birth defects. The
extent of the parents' injury is the appropriate measure of dam-
ages, the court's final consideration in recognizing wrongful
birth.71
The court approached the problem of damages in a piece-
meal fashion. The court began by employing the statutory mea-
sure of damages for an action brought by parents for an injury
to a child.73 The policy underlying the statute is to compensate
parents for both emotional damages and pecuniary losses.74 In
accordance with this policy, the measure of damages may
include all medical and educational expenses arising from the
birth of the deformed child in excess of the expense of raising a
normal child 75 and the emotional injury to the parents caused by
the birth.76 The benefit to the parents derived from having the
child may mitigate the level of compensation for their emotional
injury.77
The necessity of this special damages rule, developed by
analogy to the statute7 is unclear. The standard measure of
damages is all foreseeable costs arising from the negligent
action. 79 If the injury to the parents is the negligent limitation or
72. Other courts have arrived at different measures for damages. See supra notes
51-54 and accompanying text.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1983). The statute defines the damages available to
the parents in an action for injury or death of their child:
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury
or death of a minor child . . . . In such an action, in addition to damages for
medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss of services and support, dam-
ages may be recovered for the loss of the love and companionship of the child
and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount
as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.
Id.
74. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
75. "These damages may include pecuniary damages for extraordinary medical, edu-
cational, and similar expenses attributable to the defective condition of the children." Id.
at 477, 656 P.2d at 494.
76. "In addition, the damages may compensate for mental anguish and emotional
stress suffered by the parents during each child's life as a proximate result of the physi-
cians' negligence." Id.
77. Id. at 475, 656 P.2d at 493. This mitigation approach was applied in Eisbrenner
v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981). Contra Kingsbury v. Smith, 122
N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1983).
79. See Dyal v. Fire Cos. Adjustment Bureau, 23 Wash. 2d 515, 521-22, 161 P.2d
321, 324 (1945).
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removal of their right to decide whether to have children
because of lack of information, and that lack of information
results in a birth, then all costs resulting from the pregnancy
and birth should be considered as damages. The pecuniary dam-
ages should not have been limited to special costs attendant to
the child's injuries. In cases such as Harbeson, in which the
plaintiffs want to have a child, the countervailing benefits rule8"
could then be applied to deduct the costs of raising a normal
child. Thus, in the final result, the award to the Harbesons
would be the same. The court unnecessarily resorted to analogy
to the child injury statute.
C. Implications and Applications
The Harbeson decision permits parents to recover damages
when an absence of informed consent causes the parents to pro-
ceed with childbearing and the result is the birth of a deformed
child. Thus, "parents have a right to prevent the birth of a
defective child."8' The acceptance of the result in Speck v. Fine-
gold, however, indicates that the court should allow recovery in
cases in which a negligent medical procedure, such as an ineffec-
tive vasectomy or tubal ligation, results in pregnancy and
birth."2
The term "wrongful conception" is used when parents have
tried to avoid having children, but because of medical negli-
gence, healthy children are born.83 The court expressly declined
to address wrongful conception in Harbeson.84 Following the
lead of other states, the court distinguished wrongful conception
from wrongful birth.8 5 However, the court recently addressed the
80. The countervailing benefits rule provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
81. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
82. Id. at 467, 656 P.2d at 488. See also supra note 60.
83. For discussions of the wrongful conception action, see Holt, Wrongful Preg-
nancy, 33 S.C.L. REV. 759 (1982); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
84. "We do not in this opinion address issues which may arise where the birth of a
healthy child is allegedly caused by a breach of duty owed to the parents." Harbeson, 98
Wash. 2d at 467, 656 P.2d at 488.
85. "Other jurisdictions have consistently treated such [wrongful conception]
actions as different from, although related to, wrongful birth." Id.
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issue of wrongful conception in a decision 86 that conflicts with
the views expressed in Harbeson.
In McKernan v. Aasheim,87 the Washington Supreme Court
examined actions for wrongful conception. The plaintiffs sought
to recover damages for the costs of raising and educating a
healthy but unplanned child.8 Dr. Aasheim had performed a
tubal ligation on Mrs. McKernan, but she subsequently became
pregnant. The parents alleged that the tubal ligation was per-
formed negligently and that this negligence violated the parents'
constitutional right to prevent future pregnancies.8 9 The McKer-
nan damage request included the anticipated expenses for the
child's birth and for the parents' emotional damages associated
with the pregnancy.90 However, the McKernans went further
and requested "an amount equal to the costs associated with
rearing a child, college education, out of pocket expenses and
services of parents, and emotional burdens."91
The court rejected recovery of the costs of raising an
unwanted but healthy child.2 The court noted that the vast
majority of states denies recovery for wrongful -conception, and
that only a few states have permitted recovery.93 Many of the
rationales presented in the current majority view were rejected
by the Washington court. First, the court rejected the assump-
tion that the benefits of parenthood always outweigh the costs of
raising the child, noting that no sterilization procedures would
take place if this were true. 4 Second, the court stated that it
would not deny recovery merely because it would place an"unreasonable" burden on medical practitioners.9 Finally,
86. McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
87. 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
88. Id. at 413, 687 P.2d at 851.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 854-55.
93. The court cited the following cases: Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v.
Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d
*698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ochs v. Borelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Jones
v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman
v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). McKernan, 102 Wash. 2d at 416, 687
P.2d at 853.
94. McKernan, 102 Wash. 2d at 418, 687 P.2d at 854.
95. Id. (citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974)).
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recovery was not denied because of the risk of fraudulent
claims.96
The court presented two rationales that support the denial
of compensation for child-rearing costs. First, the benefits rule97
was rejected because the court believed that damages could not
be established with sufficient certainty. After admitting that the
costs of raising the child could be determined, the court held
that calculating the benefits conferred to the parents is impossi-
ble.98 Second, the court held that the child could suffer emo-
tional harm by discovering that he or she was unwanted and
that the parents considered him or her "damage." This risk of
emotional harm made recovery of child-rearing costs violative of
the public policy of the state.99
Even though the court stated that "[ilt is not our place to
deny recovery of certain damages merely in order to insulate
health care providers from the shock of big tort judgments,' 00
its action has in fact resulted in such insulation. In wrongful
conception actions, the parents have sought to avoid the costs,
pecuniary and emotional, of conceiving and raising a child. This
desire has been frustrated by negligent medical actions. There-
fore, the injury suffered by the parents is the cost they sought to
avoid. This cost should be the measure of damages. The court's
refusal to grant recovery of this cost infringes on the parental
right to control pregnancies and insulates medical practitioners
from responsibility for the full extent of injury caused by their
negligence.
The public policies invoked by the court in Harbeson and
McKernan are difficult to reconcile. The court recognized the
public policy of preventing negligent genetic counseling and pre-
conception treatment in Harbeson0' and allowed recovery from
physicians for the special costs arising from this negligence.
96. McKernan, 102 Wash. 2d at 418, 687 P.2d at 854.
97. Id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 855.
98. "But whether these costs [rearing and educating the child] are outweighed by
the emotional benefits which will be conferred by that child cannot be calculated." Id.
99. [T~he simple fact that the parents saw fit to allege their child as a "dam-
age" to them would carry with it the possibility of emotional harm to the child.
We are not willing to sweep this ugly possibility under the rug by stating that
the parents must be the ones to decide whether to risk the emotional well
being of their unplanned child.
Id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 855.
100. Id. at 418, 687 P.2d at 854.
101. 98 Wash. 2d at 466-67, 656 P.2d at 488.
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However, the court is willing to immunize a physician from
recovery simply because the child is not born deformed." 2 Why
should a physician's duty to provide adequate genetic counseling
and preconception treatment be limited to preventing genetic
and teratogenic disorders? The policies invoked in McKernan
are not sufficient to justify this limit. The benefits conferred to
parents by children are calculated in wrongful death actions.0 3
In those cases, the policy of fully compensating parents for their
loss overcomes the procedural difficulty of establishing damages
with certainty. 10 4 The emotional harm objection is similarly
flawed. Parents are faced with the difficult admission to their
children that they were unwanted, regardless of any lawsuit. The
parents, not the courts, are in the best position to determine the
potential for emotional harm to their children. The public poli-
cies advocated by the court for denying recovery for wrongful
conception collide with the public policies presented in support
of recovery for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
The best approach to reconcile this inconsistency is to allow
the factfinder to consider all costs related to the conception,
birth, and raising of the child. Then, as circumstances warrant,
the factfinder can reduce this amount by the amount of counter-
vailing benefits that the parents gain by the birth of the child.
This approach protects both parents, who have sought to avoid
children, and medical practitioners, who could be penalized if
parents changed their minds about the desirability of children
and sought to recover the costs of raising them.
The policy of protecting the right of parents to control preg-
nancy with medical assistance by imposing duties of informed
consent and due care in medical procedures applies equally to
cases of wrongful birth and of wrongful conception. The condi-
tion of the child, healthy or defective, should be immaterial. The
special damages rule of Harbeson should be modified not only to
allow the consideration of all costs related to the pregnancy and
102. The physicians are not immunized from damages for the parents' expense, pain
and suffering, and loss of consortium resulting from the pregnancy and birth. McKernan,
102 Wash. 2d at 421, 687 P.2d at 856. The physicians are immunized from any child-
rearing costs. Id.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1983) allows recovery for loss of the child's love
and companionship and for injury to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. If
the loss of the benefits of having a child can be calculated, then the benefits should be
ascertainable.
104. E.g., Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d 327, 329-30, 501 P.2d 1228, 1230
(1972); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 117, 426 P.2d 605, 609 (1967).
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birth, but also to allow the offset of countervailing parental ben-
efits. In addition, the denial of recovery for child-rearing costs of
normal children in McKernan should be reversed in favor of the
offset of parental benefits. These changes would reconcile wrong-
ful birth and wrongful conception and fully protect the right of
parents to practice family planning.
D. Summary
In Harbeson, the Washington Supreme Court followed the
lead of other jurisdictions and recognized the parents' cause of
action for the wrongful birth of a child born with defects. 05 The
court applied an increasingly popular, although logically prob-
lematic, measure of damages allowing only for compensation of
pecuniary and emotional damages related to the child's defects,
with no recovery for the general expenses and costs of raising a
normal child. More remarkably, the court then proceeded to rec-
ognize a child's cause of action for wrongful life.
IV. WRONGFUL LIFE
A. Historical Development
'Wrongful life is the designation given to a deformed child's
claim for damages arising from negligent advice or treatment
regarding the possible occurrence of birth defects.106 A wrongful
life claim is often asserted together with the parents' claim for
the wrongful birth of the child. The development of wrongful
life, however, differs greatly from that of wrongful birth.10 7 The
first wrongful birth case, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, °8 was also the
first wrongful life case. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected
the child's claim for damages for many of the same reasons that
prevented the parents' wrongful birth claim. 0 9 The court predi-
cated its denial of the claim on the impossibility of "measur[ing]
the difference between [the child's] life with defects against the
utter void of nonexistence. '" 1 0 Much of the support for the
105. See supra note 7.
106. Capron, supra note 1, at 647.
107. Rogers, supra note 1, at 741-42.
108. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Berman v. Allan,
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
109. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
110. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
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court's metaphysical"' view of damages was drawn from a law
review article that analyzed wrongful life damages when the
term wrongful life was used to denote illegitimacy actions. 1 2
Furthermore, the court stated that public policy 3 supported
the birth of all children, regardless of the possibility or severity
of defects." 4
The Gleitman view of wrongful life has been approved in
most jurisdictions.' 5 Even when the courts have recognized
wrongful birth, they generally have denied the child's claim."'
In addition to the difficulty of determining damages, courts have
noted that the child does not have "a fundamental right to be
born as a whole, functional human being.''1 7 By analyzing
wrongful life claims solely as a violation of a nonexistent "funda-
mental right," the courts conclude that the child does not suffer
a legally cognizable injury.
A New York court, in Park v. Chessin,"8 was the first to
approve a claim for wrongful life. Unfortunately, that case was
111. "This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonex-
istence of life itself." Id.
112. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692 ("[N]o comparison is possible since were it not for
the act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from
under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to prove his damages.")
(quoting Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 529
(1966)).
113. "The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say what defects
should prevent an embryo from being allowed life . Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227
A.2d at 693.
114. "It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heav-
ily burdened." Id.
115. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying
South Carolina law) (child born with Down's syndrome); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d
546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (child born with serious deformities); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979) (child born with Down's syndrome), modified, Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386
N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978) (child born with Down's syndrome);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (child born with rubella syndrome);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975) (child
born with rubella syndrome).
116. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979), modified, Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53,
432 A.2d 834 (1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975).
117. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 364, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979), modified,
497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (supreme court evenly divided on wrongful life claim).
118. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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quickly overruled in Becker v. Schwartz,11 in which the New
York Court of Appeals12 ° returned to the Gleitman position.
Once again, a court chose the inconsistent view that permits a
claim for wrongful birth, but rejects a claim for wrongful life.
California was the only other jurisdiction to precede Wash-
ington in recognizing wrongful life actions.12" ' In Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories,'22 the California Court of Appeals
held that a child could bring an action for wrongful life. 2 ' The
child was born with Tay-Sachs disease" 4 after physicians had
negligently performed genetic tests that resulted in a subsequent
failure to inform the parents adequately of the risk of defects.'25
Under California law, a child receives compensation for pain and
suffering throughout its projected life span, special pecuniary
damages arising from its deformities, and punitive damages. 26
The Curlender court answered the metaphysical concerns
regarding wrongful life claims that were enunciated in Gleitman.
The court stated that it "need not be concerned with the fact
that had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not
have come into existence at all.' 1 27 Instead, the court allowed
the claim because "the reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is
that a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of
others."'128 Employing this rationale, the court held that the test-
ing laboratories owed a duty of adequate care in administering
genetic tests to "parents and their as yet unborn children.' 29
Adequate care in the administration of genetic tests is necessary
119. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). The Becker court
stated that "a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for wrong-
ful life demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the
Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence." Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at
812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
120. The New York Court of Appeals is the highest appellate court in the state of
New York.
121. New Jersey subsequently approved a wrongful life action in Procanik v. Cillo,
97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
122. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), overruled in part, Turpin v.
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
123. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
124. Tay-Sachs disease is a hereditary disorder chiefly affecting children of Jewish
ancestry and is characterized by progressive dementia and progressive loss of vision
resulting in blindness, paralysis, and death. DORLAND'S, supra note 16, at 760.
125. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
126. Id. at 831-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
127. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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to inform parents properly of the risks of genetic disorders. Once
this duty is established, the normal elements of tort present no
obstacles to the child's recovery. 130
However, this inclusion of general damages in wrongful life
claims did not survive long. The California Supreme Court re-
examined the issue of wrongful life damages in Turpin v. Sor-
tini.13 1 The plaintiff in Turpin sought compensation for suffer-
ing caused by a hereditary hearing loss. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendant physician was negligent in failing to diagnose
the same type of hearing disorder in an older sibling. 32 This
diagnostic failure was alleged to be a violation of the duty of
adequate care in genetic counseling established in Curlender.133
The California Court of Appeals had denied any recovery for the
child's defect. 13 The California Supreme Court took the oppor-
tunity to set forth a different measure of damages3 5 and to
retreat from the broad Curlender view of wrongful life damages.
Most of the criticism of Curlender involved the statement
that the court need not be concerned with the fact that had the
physician not been negligent, the child might not have been
born.13 The court seemed to return to the traditional view that
no legally cognizable injury existed. 137 General damages were,
therefore, rejected because of the controversy as to whether such
a birth is actually an injury and because of the apparent diffi-
culty in assessing damages for that injury.138
The California Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that, as a matter of law, existence with very severe deformities is
always preferable to nonexistence.13 9 Thus, even though the
court rejected the claim for general damages, the claim for spe-
cial damages arising from the child's defect was allowed.140 The
distinction was based on the view that "it would be illogical and
anomalous to permit only parents [through a wrongful birth
action], and not the child, to recover for the costs of the child's
130. Id. at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
131. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
132. Id. at 223-24, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
133. Id. at 228, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
134. Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981).
135. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
136. Id. at 231, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
137. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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own medical care."'1 4 1 Since no difficulty existed in determining
these special damages, and since recovery could help offset the
costs of living with the defects, the court allowed recovery of
special damages.' 41 When Harbeson was decided, California
remained the only other state recognizing even a limited recov-
ery for wrongful life.
B. The Washington View
In analyzing whether recovery should be allowed for wrong-
ful life, the Washington Supreme Court took a position similar
to the view of the Turpin court. Wrongful life was defined as a
child's claim "that but for the inadequate advice [of the physi-
cian], it would not have been born to experience the pain and
suffering attributable to the deformity.' ' 43 The court noted that
permitting parents, rather than children, to recover for the
child's special costs was "illogical. '144 The court also stated that
the child's special costs would not "miraculously disappear when
the child attains his majority."' 46
The court needed to decide who should bear the burden of
these special costs. Either the parents (and possibly the govern-
ment) or the persons who proximately caused the defects would
assume the risk. Reasoning that the physicians had access to the
information needed to reduce the risk of the special costs, the
court chose the latter option and imposed liability. '46
After deciding to impose liability, the court compared the
wrongful life action with the standard elements of negligence.1 47
The first and most troubling element in the wrongful life cause
of action is duty.'48 At the time of the medical practitioner's
potentially negligent action, the child seeking damages has not
been conceived. The question raised is whether a duty extends
to persons not yet conceived.' 49 The answer is foreseeability.' 50
141. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
142. Id. at 238-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
143. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 478, 656 P.2d at 494 (quoting Comment, "Wrongful
Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 485 (1980) (emphasis in
original)).
144. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 479, 656 P.2d at 495 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982)).
145. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 479, 656 P.2d at 495.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 495.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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At one time, tort liability was not recognized before birth.'5 '
However, negligently caused prenatal injuries have been actiona-
ble by the child for many years in Washington. 152 If birth is not
a valid limit for tort liability because the injury is foreseeable,
then conception should not be a limit either. Such a limitation
would only serve to immunize medical practitioners from reme-
dying foreseeable negligence simply because no child had yet
been conceived. Therefore, the court chose to extend the duty of
proper medical care to persons not yet conceived, as long as the
injury to the child was foreseeable.' 53 Since the Madigan physi-
cians in Harbeson knew of the Harbesons' intention to have
additional children, future birth was obviously foreseeable and,
thus, an injury to a child not yet conceived was foreseeable. 54
Given this definition of duty premised on foreseeability, both
the elements of duty and breach of duty were satisfied.'55
The compelling, if somewhat understated, reason for impos-
ing a preconception duty is that public policy promotes proper
genetic counseling and preconception medical care.' The court
included a footnote from Turpin that argued that permitting
recovery would serve as a deterrent to negligent conduct.18 7 The
deterrence value of recovery has been noted by a number of
commentators on the issues of wrongful birth and wrongful
life. "'58 Permitting recovery from the negligent party would also
provide "more comprehensive and consistent compensation"' 59
150. Id.
151. For a review of the origin of prenatal tort liability, see Comment, Wrongful
Death of the Fetus: Viability Is Not a Viable Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 103
(1984).
152. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 837-38
(1962) (negligent pelvic examination and delivery technique caused brain damage during
delivery). See Comment, supra note 151, at 103.
153. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d at 495.
154. Id. at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
155. Id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 496.
156. Id. at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
157. Id. "Permitting recovery of these extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses whether
the cost is to be borne by the parents or the child should also help ensure that the
available tort remedies in this area provide a comprehensive and consistent deterrent to
negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349
n.15).
158. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 755-57; Comment, Wrongful Life: An Infant's
Claim to Damages, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 587, 604-06 (1981). See generally Note, Father
and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978).
159. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
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than would be otherwise available. These public policy goals
present a defensible basis for the duty underlying the wrongful
life cause of action.
Once the court expanded the duty of proper medical care,
including informed consent, to include foreseeable preconception
actions, proximate cause did not serve as an impediment to
recovery. The standard "but for" causation test was met in the
Harbeson case. The Harbesons contended that they would not
have conceived Elizabeth and Christine had the Madigan physi-
cians warned them of the effect of Dilantin.1 60 Thus, "but for"
the physician's failure to inform the Harbesons of the risks of
continuing to take Dilantin, Elizabeth and Christine would not
have been born and would not suffer from the defects associated
with fetal hydantoin syndrome.161
Injury was the final, and most controversial, element before
the court.1"2 The Washington court adopted the special damages
rule developed in Turpin.1 1 3 The recovery of general damages
proposed in Curlender was rejected.1 64 The contention that
recovery for wrongful life disavows the sanctity of life did not
persuade the Washington court.16 5 The court was persuaded,
however, by the metaphysical view that general damages are
incalculable. 6 Without a means of calculating the extent of
injury with sufficient certainty, the court was unwilling to permit
compensation for that injury.
The same public policy goals that support the imposition of
a duty support the recovery of special damages. The child born
with defects has special medical and educational expenses,
which must be borne by the parents, the government, or the
negligent physician. Only the physician has the skill and the
access to information sufficient to reduce the risks of negligent
genetic counseling. The physician then should bear the costs
commensurate with the ability to reduce the risk. Permitting the
physician to escape this responsibility will only increase the
financial burden of the parents or the government. Therefore,
allowing recovery of special damages is the most equitable allo-
160. Id. at 463, 656 P.2d at 486.
161. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
162. Id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 496.
163. Id. at 479, 656 P.2d at 495.
164. Id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 496.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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cation of those expenses because the burden of risk is borne by
the physician rather than by the parents or the state.
The allowance of special damages is an exception to the typ-
ical measure of damages. Generally, damages compensate the
injured party by attempting to return the injured party to the
position that he or she would have been in had the injury not
occured. In other words, the damages serve to make the injured
party whole."' The problem with the typical measure of dam-
ages in wrongful life actions is that the position the children
would have been in, had the negligence not occurred, is nonexis-
tence.16 8 Courts deciding claims for harm caused by the drug
diethylstilbestrol 69 (DES) have created a special damages rule
to provide compensation from the negligent parties.17 0 Wrongful
life damages should be similarly calculated to provide "more
comprehensive and consistent compensation. 1 7 1 The public pol-
icy goals of deterring negligent preconception counseling and
treatment and of compensating children born with defects
caused by that negligence justify this exception to the standard
measure of damages.
In summation, the Washington Supreme Court followed the
lead of the California Supreme Court in Turpin and recognized
a limited version of wrongful life. Although the standard rule for
calculating damages does not easily fit wrongful life claims, the
public policy goals of deterring negligent genetic counseling and
preconception medical treatment and compensating children
born with defects caused by the negligence override the meta-
physical and doctrinal problems and support recovery of special
damages in cases of wrongful life.
167. See Capron, supra note 1, at 654-57.
168. "We agree .. .that measuring the value of an impaired life as compared to
nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals, whether judges or jurors. However, we do
not agree that the impossibility of valuing life and nonexistence precludes the action
altogether." Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 482, 656 P.2d at 496.
169. Diethylstilbestrol is an estrogen-like chemical used to treat hormonal problems.
DORLAND'S, supra note 23, at 443. The drug has been alleged as a cause of defects in
children of women taking it.
170. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (minority view), cert. denied, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980). For an analysis
of DES claims in the wrongful life setting, see Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp.
537, 543-44 n.12 (D.S.C. 1980).
171. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
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V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The recognition of actions for wrongful birth, and particu-larly those for wrongful life, fostered considerable public,172
scholarly,173 and legislative"" reaction. The actions have been
perceived as requiring the use of abortion as a family planning
option.1 75 In apparent response to this position, several states
have promulgated legislation barring claims for both wrongful
birth and wrongful life. Minnesota, 176 South Dakota,1 77 and
Utah 1 78 have passed legislation barring actions for either wrong-
ful birth or wrongful life. The Minnesota and Utah statutes refer
only to the choice between abortion and live birth.1 79 Only the
South Dakota statute extends the bar on actions to choices
between conceiving and not conceiving potentially deformed
children.1 80 Interestingly, none of these states has ever recog-
172. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 7, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
173. See generally Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful
Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REV. 473 (1983); Note, Wrongful Life: A Tort
Resuscitated: Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 167 (1983); Note,
Wrongful Life Recognized in Washington: Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 44 MONT. L. REV.
291 (1983); Note, Washington Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-A Criti-
cal Analysis, 58 WASH. L. REV. 649 (1983).
174. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
175. One author has commented:
Conservative lobby groups have taken the court decisions as representing a
proabortion opinion. They have attacked the decision and the Harbesons in
the media . . . .Attorney Ken VanDerhoef, president of a group called Wash-
ington State Human Life, spoke out this spring in a weekly paper that serves
the Catholic community in Western Washington. "The Harbeson decision is
based on the erroneous supposition that we can legally destroy life. If abortion
were not legal they wouldn't have been able to expand the theory the way they
did. It is clearly a mandatory abortion case."
Korn, Something Is Wrong With My Child!, STUDENT LAWYER, Sept. 1983, at 22, 28.
176. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1984). Subdivision 1 provides: "No person
shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of himself
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another he would have been
aborted." Subdivision 2 provides: "No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive
an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child
would have been aborted."
177. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (1984) provide: "There shall be no cause of
action or award of damages on behalf of any person based on the claim that, but for the
conduct of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive."
178. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1983) provides: "A cause of action shall not arise,
and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but
for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been
born alive but would have been aborted."
179. See supra notes 176, 178.
180. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-1 (1983) provide: "There shall be no cause of
action or award of damages on behalf of any person based on the claim of that person
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nized either wrongful birth or wrongful life. In other states
where one of the two actions is recognized, no legislation has
been enacted to abolish the action.
Members of the Washington Legislature reacted quickly to
the recognition of wrongful birth and wrongful life. Within one
month of the announcement of the Harbeson decision, four
bills181 relating to wrongful birth and wrongful life were intro-
duced in the legislature. Two of the bills barred actions for
wrongful birth and wrongful life when the parents' choice was
between abortion and live birth.18 2 The third bill suggested bar-
ring all actions for wrongful birth or wrongful life, including
choices of whether or not to conceive a child.183 These three bills
that, but for the conduct of another, he would not have been conceived or, once con-
ceived, would not have been permitted to have been born alive."
181. See infra notes 182-83 & 187.
182. H.B. 178, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983); S.B. 3269, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983).
Both bills sought to add the following sections to WASH. REV. CODE ch. 4.24:
Sec. 1 ....
No person may maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, he or she
would have been aborted.
Sec. 2 ....
No person may maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would
have been aborted.
Sec. 3 ....
Nothing in section 1 or 2 of this act precludes a cause of action for intentional
or negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the failure
of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure. Nor shall section 1 or 2 of
this act preclude a cause of action based on a claim that, but for the negligent
conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided or would
have been provided properly which would have made possible the prevention,
cure, or amelioration of any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap. Abortion,
however, shall not be considered to be a means of preventing, curing, or ame-
liorating any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap.
Both bills were referred to the Committees on the Judiciary, where they remained.
183. S.B. 3615, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983). The bill sought to add the following
sections to WASH. REV. CODE ch. 4.24:
Sec. 1 .....
No person may maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
based on the claim that, but for the conduct of another, such person would not
have been conceived or, once conceived, would not have been permitted to be
born alive. The term "conception," as used in this section, means the fertiliza-
tion of a human ovum by a human sperm, which occurs when the sperm pene-
trates the cell membrane of the ovum.
Sec. 2 .....
No person may maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
based on the claim that, but for the conduct of another, a person would not
have been permitted to be born alive.
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sought to preclude recovery for wrongful birth and wrongful life
because the actions were perceived as mandating abortion.184
Nothing in either the theory of the actions or in the lan-
guage of the Harbeson decision supports that perception. The
actions only recognize abortion as a privacy right available to
parents in accordance with Roe v. Wade. 85 The interference
with this decision creates a need for the legal remedy.186
Although many individuals and groups oppose abortion, as long
as abortion receives protection as a constitutional privacy inter-
est, the opposition should not and indeed cannot bar the actions
for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
The fourth Washington bill advocated an immunization of
parents from wrongful life claims. 187 In California, the Curlender
court discussed, in dictum, the possibility of children bringing
wrongful life actions against their parents. l88 In response, the
California Legislature passed an immunizing law.8 9 Such legisla-
tion is not necessary because wrongful life actions, as currently
defined, cannot reach parents. 90 The action furthers the deter-
rence of negligent genetic counseling and medical treatment.
Sec. 3 ...
The failure or the refusal of a person to prevent a live birth shall not be con-
sidered in awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any action. The fail-
ure or the refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person is not a
defense in any action.
Sec. 4.....
Except as specifically provided, the provisions of sections 1 through 3 of this
act do not prohibit a cause of action or award of damages based on the claim
that a person is liable for injury caused by such person's wilful acts or caused
by such person's want of ordinary care or skill.
The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where it remained.
184. See supra note 175.
185. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
186. Id. at 466-67, 656 P.2d at 488.
187. S.B. 3307, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983). The bill sought to add the following
section to WASH. REV. CODE ch. 4.24:
A parent or guardian, or if such person is deceased, his or her estate or per-
sonal representative, shall be immune from civil action for damages arising out
of a child's birth in a defective condition, unless the parent's illegal activity
was the proximate cause of the defective condition and the child has not
refused available treatment or rehabilitation in connection with the resulting
condition.
The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where it remained.
188. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
189. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1984). "No cause of action arises against a par-
ent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or, if
conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive."
190. See Capron, supra note 1, at 661-66.
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Nothing in this policy goal seeks to preempt the parents' deci-
sion of whether to seek or continue a pregnancy; therefore the
action could not extend to the parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court correctly recognized
actions for wrongful birth and wrongful life. These actions serve
public policy because of their deterrent effect on negligent
genetic counseling and preconception medical treatment.
Actions for wrongful birth have been consistently recognized in
other jurisdictions since 1973, and Washington has followed that
trend. The court's measure of damages for wrongful birth is con-
sistent with other states' damage calculations. However, the
measure does not include the total harm resulting from the
interference with the parents' rights. The Washington courts
should modify the measure to consider fully the costs and bene-
fits resulting from an unwanted pregnancy, and should extend it
to actions in which the child is born healthy.
Wrongful life is a more troubling and a more controversial
matter. Only California had allowed any recovery for wrongful
life before Harbeson. All other jurisdictions have rejected recov-
ery on metaphysical grounds. Washington has correctly accepted
the benefits of public policy over the hindrance of metaphysics.
While the traditional tort calculation of damages is not applied
in the Harbeson decision, the public policy noted above and the
certainty of measuring special damages justify this deviation.
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions have met with con-
siderable criticism arising from the emotional connotations of
the terms themselves and from the misperception that the
actions encourage abortions. This misperception has caused
some states to bar wrongful life and wrongful birth actions. Bills
introduced in the Washington Legislature would impose a simi-
lar bar. These bills and the criticism of the decision by anti-
abortion groups should be rejected. Actions for wrongful birth
and wrongful life are necessary and proper extensions of medical
malpractice principles into the arena of genetic and preconcep-
tion counseling.
Eric B. Schmidt
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